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ELECTED OFFICIALS CAN No LONGER REWARD SUPPORTERS
WI JOBS ... OR CAN THEY?
George Washington Plunkitt, famous advocate and practitioner of
political patronage systems,1 once opined:
I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments nobody can
answer.
First, this great and glorious country was built upon by political parties;
second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't get offices when
they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up
must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay.
2
The Supreme Court's decision in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois a
will allow political scientists to test Plunkitt's hypothesis. The Rutan
decision struck down Illinois Governor Jim Thompson's patronage sys-
tem4 as violative of state employees' first amendment rights to free speech
* Project Editor: Tammy J. Snyder.
1. A "patronage system" for purposes of this Recent Development refers to a system of re-
warding supporters of elected government officials, or their parties, with jobs or favorable treatment
regarding promotions, transfers, and rehiring. Patronage in its broadest sense connotes requiring an
individual to obtain a sponsor in order to gain employment, as opposed to a strict civil service system
in which employment decisions are merit-based. T. BEYLE, STATE GOVERNMENT: CQ's GUIDE TO
ISSUES AND AcnrITiEs 1989-90, at 133 (1990). See infra note 4.
Although some people negatively associate the word "patronage," patronage as used in this Re-
cent Development is descriptive rather than judgmental. The patronage system scrutinized in Rutan
v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 13 (1990), contained elements of the
civil service system. Under Illinois law, all state employees must pass civil service exams tailored to
their positions. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 63b101 et. seq. (1985). Thus, the beneficiaries of the
patronage system unquestionably were qualified as defined by Illinois law.
2. W. RORDON, PLuNxrrr OF TAMMANY HALL 18-19 (1948), quoted in Rutan v. Republi-
can Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
4. The state officials in Rutan asserted that it was critical that the complaint did not allege a
"strict partisan" patronage system. Rather, the allegations should encompass the Thompson Ad-
ministration's consideration of other factors not related to party affiliation, including friendships
with Republicans, Governor Thompson's family, or members of the Illinois General Assembly.
Brief for Respondents/Cross Petitioners at 2-3, Rutan, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (Nos. 88-1872 and 88-
2074). The state officials also argued that because all candidates met the qualifications under the
Illinois Personnel Code, the plaintiffs could not claim that the state hired, promoted, or transferred
unqualified but politically favored persons at the expense of qualified but unfavored persons. Id.
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and association. The 5-4 decision 5 held that the first amendment right to
free speech and association prohibits public employers from basing pro-
motion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions on party membership or
support.' Proponents of the decision claim a victory for free speech and
better government.' Others denounce the decision as an unwise judicial
intrusion into state politics and another note in the death knell of our
two-party system of government.8 Still others believe that the Rutan de-
cision is so easy to evade that its only effect will be to create jobs for
employment discrimination lawyers.9
Rutan is the last in a trilogy of Supreme Court cases holding that gov-
ernment officials cannot make employment decisions based on an em-
ployee's political party affiliation. 10 In 1976, the Court in Elrod v.
Burns 11 held that a sheriff violated former employees' first amendment
rights of free speech and association when he replaced them with mem-
bers of the Democratic Party.12 The Court's plurality opinion noted that
"political belief and association constitute the core of those activities pro-
tected by the first amendment." 3 Thus, the Court concluded that re-
quiring public employees to pledge their allegiance to a political party
imposes unconstitutional restraints on the freedoms of speech and
association. 14
5. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia dis-
sented joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Justice O'Connor joined in parts II
and III of the dissent.
6. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2732.
7. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
10. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). See infra
notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
11. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
12. Id. at 347. Sheriff Richard Elrod fired both the Chief Deputy of the Process Division and a
bailiff. In addition, he threatened to fire a process server if he did not obtain the support of the
Democratic Party. Id. at 350-51.
13. Id. at 356. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 742 (1943) ("[iff there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein"), quoted in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356; Buckley v. Valeo 424
U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression"),
quoted in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357. For other cases discussing freedom to associate with a political
party, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1966); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57
(1973).
14. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357-59. For cases addressing various other state employment practices,
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The Court employed a strict scrutiny standard to determine whether
the justifications for patronage dismissals outweighed the infringement
on the employee's constitutional rights.15 The Court disregarded the in-
see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 300 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (Congress cannot enact regulations
prohibiting members of a certain party or race from appointment to federal office) (dicta); Weiman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (states cannot require employees to take a loyalty oath denying
past affiliation with Communists). See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961)
(security officer cannot be dismissed from her job requiring security clearance on the basis of party
affiliation) (dicta); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down a New York
statute prohibiting state employees from associating with subversive organizations); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (state college professor has first amendment claim if the state's
refusal to review his employment contract was the result of his public criticism of school-board
policies). In Perry, the Court held that the first amendment prohibits the government from denying
a public benefit to a person in a manner inhibiting the exercise of free speech. Thus, the government
impermissibly penalizes a person for exercising political beliefs if it denies employment because of
political association. Id.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Elrod, thought that the minimal free speech consideration did
not warrant federal intrusion into state politics. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 376 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Without passing on the effectiveness of the patronage system, the Chief Justice wrote that the tenth
amendment gives states the choice to use patronage in the management of its functions. He accused
the plurality of "trivializing constitutional adjudication." Id.
Justice Powell's dissent in Elrod argued that not only does the first amendment not require the
Court to prevent patronage dismissals, but that the plurality opinion actually undermines the core
values of the first amendment. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell further
argued that in employing its balancing test, the plurality not only failed to appreciate the role of the
patronage system, but also exaggerated the characterization of the first amendment rights impli-
cated. Id. at 382. According to Justice Powell, patronage strengthens political parties and creates
opportunities for minority groups. Id. at 382 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) (the
government has strong interests in stable parties because they provide a medium for presenting citi-
zens with understandable choices and with support once the winner takes office)). The Storer Court
also held that "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [might] do significant damage to the
fabric of government." Storer, 415 U.S. at 735, quoted in Elrod 427 U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). See also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 382 n.6 (quoting S. LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PoLmCS
76-77 (1952) (patronage helps open opportunities to minorities, because once a member of a minority
group is appointed, she will have the opportunity to employ other minorities)). Without question,
patronage politics helped ethnic minorities gain political power during the industrial revolution of
the 1880s, when racial and ethnic hatred was widespread. D. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN
CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 50-52 (1984).
15. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. The plurality noted that when the government significantly impairs
a person's first amendment rights, it must show some vital government interest and demonstrate that
no less restrictive means of accomplishing that interest are available. Id. Furthermore, the benefit
gained from the government action must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights. Id.
The plurality applied this standard without explaining why the infringement on first amendment
rights was "substantial." See infra note 31 and accompanying text. The Court expressly declined to
apply a "rational relation" test, whereby the government merely needs to show that the govern-
ment's conduct was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
The Supreme Court previously has applied the less demanding rational relation test to situations
in which the government acts in its capacity as employer. However, the strict standard applies when
the government regulates the conduct of private citizens. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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terests of the political parties and instead focused on whether the govern-
ment had a vital interest in patronage. 16 For example, for positions that
involve policymaking or access to confidential information, the Court
held that the government properly may require party affiliation. 7
In 1980, the Court in Branti v. Finkel 8 held that the first amendment
prohibited a Democratic public defender from requiring that his assistant
public defenders obtain Democratic Party support in order to keep their
jobs.19 Reaffirming Elrod,2 ° the Court ruled that failure to obtain a polit-
ical sponsor cannot be the sole basis for depriving incumbent public em-
ployees of continued employment.2'
The Elrod and Branti decisions protect public employees fired because
of their political affiliations, or lack thereof.22 The Court's decision in
Rutan further extends that protection to public employees who have
been denied promotions or transfers on the basis of their failure to sup-
port the political party in power. Furthermore, the holding reaches
would-be public employees who are not recalled after a layoff or who are
not hired because of their party affiliation.23
16. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. Justice Powell's dissent argued that the Court's distinction between
what is beneficial for parties and what is beneficial for government is flawed. The Court had stated
in other opinions that strong political parties are important to the effective functioning of govern-
ment. Id. at 383 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Storer, 415 U.S. at 735; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
98 (1976) (political parties are important to the effective management of our government).
17. ERrod, 427 U.S. at 367. The plurality admitted, however, that the distinction between
policymakers and nonpolicymakers is a fine line. Id.
18. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
19. Id. The Court in Branti elaborated further on the policy-maker exception and concluded
that the appropriate test is "whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Id. at 518.
20. Branti extended the Elrod rationale to situations in which the government requires employ-
ees to gain support from a political party. The Elrod holding involved employee dismissals for
failure to be an actual member of a political party.
21. Id. at 516-17.
22. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
23. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (1990).
Justice Scalia's dissent proposes several reasons why the Court's decision was wrong. 110 S. Ct. at
2746-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra notes 34, 40-42, and accompanying text. First, Scalia
argues that the Court has no basis for striking the government's previously unchallenged practice of
patronage when the Bill of Rights does not expressly prohibit it. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2747-49.
Justice Scalia's view is not original; Justice Holmes once wrote that "[i]f a thing has been practiced
for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment
to affect it." Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922), quoted in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 389
(Powell, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Scalia argues that the desirability of patronage is a political
question more appropriately addressed by the state's legislature. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2750.
Justice Scalia's opinion cites the following inconsistent cases to demonstrate that Elrod and Brand
[Vol. 69:925
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In Rutan, Governor Thompson issued an executive order in late
198024 that imposed a hiring freeze on positions within his administra-
tion. To implement the order, Governor Thompson created the Office of
Personnel to review applications in order to determine whether: 1) the
applicant voted in Republican primaries in past election years; 2) the ap-
plicant provided financial or other support to the Republican Party; 3)
the applicant promised to join and work for the party; and 4) the appli-
cant had the support of Republican Party officials.25
Five employees of the State of Illinois brought suit against Illinois Re-
publican Party officials, alleging that they suffered employment discrimi-
nation for failing to support the Republican Party.26 The named
are unworkable and should be overturned: Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1338 (4th Cir. 1984)
(city cannot fire a deputy sheriff because of his political affiliation); Layden v. Costello, 517 F. Supp.
860, 962 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (county cannot fire its attorney for the department of social services
because of party affiliation); Tavano v. County of Niagra, 621 F. Supp. 345, 349-50 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
(cannot fire assistant attorney for family court), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Ness v.
Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1981) (city can fire its solicitor and his assistants); Finkel-
stein v. Barthelemy, 678 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (E.D.L.A. 1988) (can fire assistant city attorney); Livas
v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1983) (can fire assistant state's attorney); Barnes v. Bosley,
745 F.2d 501, 508 (8th Cir. 1984) (city cannot discharge its deputy court clerk for his political
affiliation), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1986)
(city can fire its legal assistant to the clerk on basis of party affiliation), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987); Balogh v. Charron, 855 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1988) (firing juvenile court bailiff permissible if
assigned permanently to a single judge); Abraham v. Pekarski, 537 F. Supp. 858, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(city cannot fire its director of roads on partisan grounds), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 728
F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); Tomezak v. Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir)
(city can fire the second in command of the water department), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); De
Choudens v. Government Dev. Bank, 801 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (government cannot discharge
the senior vice president of its development bank for political reasons), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1987); Rosario Nevarez v. Torres Gaztambide, 820 F.2d 525 (Ist Cir. 1987) (government can dis-
charge the regional director of its rural housing administration).
24. Executive Order No. 5 (Nov. 12, 1980).
STATE OF [SEAL] ILLINOIS
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS
EXECUTIVE ORDER Number 5 - (1980)
HIRING FREEZE
Effective at the close of business today, November 12, 1980, no agency, department, bu-
reau, board or commission subject to the control or direction of the Governor shall hire
any employee, fill any vacancy, create any new position or take any other action which will
result in increases, or the maintenance of present levels, in State employment, including
personal service contracts. All hiring is frozen. There will be no exceptions to this order
without my express permission after submission of appropriate requests to my office.
25. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2732. The Republican county chairpersons developed the form and
submitted it to the Governor's Office of Personnel. Id.
26. Id. at 2732-33. Cynthia B. Rutan had worked as a rehabilitation counselor for the State
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petitioner, Cynthia Rutan, alleged that the State denied her promotion to
positions for which she was qualified because she had neither worked for
nor obtained the support of the Republican Party.27
The Supreme Court held that the State's refusals to promote, hire,
transfer, and recall employees were significant penalties imposed on the
exercise of the employees' first amendment rights.28 Rejecting the re-
spondents' argument that there is no constitutional right to be promoted,
transferred, hired, or recalled, the Court relied on Perry v. Sindermann 29
to illustrate that, although a person does not have a right to a govern-
ment job, the State may not deny that person a job "on a basis that in-
fringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
free speech."'30
The Court employed a strict scrutiny standard in weighing the state's
interest against the interests of the individuals, requiring the government
to show that its practice is "narrowly tailored to further vital government
interests."31 The respondents, however, failed to establish any overriding
since 1974. Four other employees also were involved in the suit: Franklin Taylor, an equipment
operator for the Illinois Department of Transportation since 1969, allegedly was denied a promotion
to lead worker in 1983 in favor of someone who had the support of a Republican county chairman,
and was denied requested transfers because of his failure to obtain the support of the Republican
Party; Ricky Standefer, a part-time garage worker for the State, allegedly was laid off and not recal-
led because he had voted in the Democratic Party primary; Dan O'Brien, an employee at the Depart-
ment of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities facility from 1971 to 1984, was laid off and
never recalled, allegedly due to his political affiliation. Finally, James Moore received a letter from
his Illinois state representative stating that he had no chance of being hired unless he obtained the
support of his Republican county chairman. Brief for Petitioners at 6-10, Rutan v. Republican
Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (Nos. 88-1872 and 88-2074).
27. Brief for Petitioners at 6-10, Rutan, 110 S. Ct. 2729.
28. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737. Previously, the Seventh Circuit held that the petitioners had a
constitutional claim only if they had been subjected to the equivalent of a dismissal. Rutan v. Re-
publican Party, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1989). The court of appeals distinguished its more permissive
standard from the strict standard set forth in Elrod and Branti, reasoning that denial of a promotion,
hire, transfer, or recall is significantly less coercive and disruptive than a discharge. Id. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that federal intrusion into state political affairs, which is justified in cases involving
dismissals, is not warranted in situations in which the employee is subjected to decisions less signifi-
cant than dismissals. Id. at 955.
29. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See supra note 14.
30. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2736 (quoting Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597).
31. Id. While the Rutan standard is consistent with Elrod and Branti, the dissenting justices
noted that previous decisions employed a less demanding "rational connection" test when examining
the practices of a government engaged for the management of its affairs. See, eg., Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 152 (1982); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (applying a less strict balancing
test announced in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). The dissent cited
precedent that recognizes that it is permissible for the government to regulate conduct in its capacity
as an employer. Justice Scalia, applying the logic of one such case, wrote: "Since the government
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government interest in patronage practices.32 The Court asserted that
other less intrusive means of securing effective employees are available,
such as firing only those employees whose performance is unacceptable.33
Justice Brennan's majority opinion also rejected the respondents' argu-
ment that the patronage system furthers the democratic process and nur-
tures the two party system.34 Finally, the Court stated bluntly that it
was not concerned that the decision would expose state employment de-
cisions to excessive federal court interference. 5
Proponents of the Rutan decision argue that it will improve the ad-
ministration of state and local government.36 Government employees
will perform more effectively if they know that their career paths will be
determined by their performance rather than by their political activities.
Government careers will become more attractive to talented people who
previously refused to work in the public sector due to patronage.3 7
Despite Rutan's positive effects, the decision has created more
may dismiss an employee for political speech 'reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the
efficiency of the public service,'.. . it follows afortiori that the government may dismiss an employee
for political affiliation if 'reasonably necessary to promote effective government.'" Rutan, 110 S.
Ct. at 2750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 (1980)).
32. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
33. Id. The Court also noted that the policy-maker exception, which allows a government to
dismiss high level employees based on their political affiliation, adequately serves to ensure that
government policies will be advanced effectively. Id.
34. Id. The Court rejected the argument without analysis. Its reference to Elrod is to a simi-
larly conclusory statement. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73. The Elrod Court did not provide a single
example of a less intrusive means of nurturing political parties. The Court only alluded to the na-
tional decline of the patronage system and to the growth of form letters, advertising, and other
money-intensive campaign methods. Arguably, these means of campaigning have dismantled rather
than nurtured political parties. See generally J. HREBENAR & R. SCOTT, INTEREST GROUP POLI-
TICS IN AMERICA 256-59 (1982); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CQ's GUIDE TO CURRENT
ISSUES AND AcvnaES 134 (1989-90); Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 MiDwEsr J. POL. SCI. 118-
20 (1959).
35. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737 n.8.
36. Professor Charles Haar of Harvard Law School stated, "[ln a society that emphasizes
education and objective qualifications, it seems to me all to the good to place more emphasis on
merit." Boston Globe, June 22, 1990, at 11. John Manske, executive director of Common Cause of
Illinois, filed a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioners. Manske cheered the decision as "a
great day for professionalism in government and the success of individuals based on merit." Chicago
Tribune, June 22, 1990, at 8. In another Chicago Tribune article, Frank Parker of the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights claimed that the Rutan decision "restores the civil service system to its
original concept of eliminating political favoritism." Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1990, at 1.
37. Nowlan, Death Knell For Political Patronage? Hardly, Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990, at
19. James D. Nowlan is a former Illinois state legislator and agency director, and a professor of
public policy at Knox College.
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problems than it has solved.3" Political scientists deplore the decision as
destroying what remained of the working-class citizen's participation in
the two-party system.39 Justice Scalia stated in his dissent that the deci-
sion eliminates a mechanism for minority groups to secure political
power.' Moreover, elected officials will be unable to engage in political
give and take with their constituents and will have no jobs to offer. As a
result, politicians, looking to alternative campaign methods such as ex-
pensive television or radio commercials to gain re-election,4' likely will
offer political favors to special interest groups in exchange for campaign
financing.42 Indeed, this quid pro quo occurs in many states as well as in
the federal government, where a straight merit-based system has replaced
the patronage system.4 3
The Rutan decision also will create a flood of lawsuits by disgruntled
applicants who are denied promotions, denied transfers, or who are not
hired or not recalled after layoffs. 44 Courts might extend the decision to
limitless contexts, providing a forum to question every decision involving
distribution of a government benefit.45 Furthermore, the Rutan decision
38. See infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. "The court, with a decision written in broad
strokes, has created innumerable problems for local government while trying to address abuses that
should be corrected at the ballot box." Editorial, Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990, at 18. "The
Rutan decision poses more questions than it answers and invites lawsuits.... There will still be job
patronage." Nowlan, supra note 37.
39. Larry Sabato, author of GOODBYE TO GOODTIME CHARLIE 67 (2d ed. 1983), a book dis-
cussing the transformation of the American governorship, stated: "This is a terrible, tragic decision
for the two-party system. Patronage is the oil that greases the machine of government. It's been an
essential part of a functioning two-party democracy." L.A. Times, June 22, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
40. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2753-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing CORNWELL, BOSSES, MACHINES
AND ETHNIC POLITICS in ETmNC GROUP POLITICS 190, 195-97 (1969)). See also 54 PUBLIC
CHOICE 171, 181 (1987) (noting that the election of a black mayor and the accompanying patronage
hiring led to increase of political influence among blacks in Atlanta).
41. T. BEYLE, supra note 1, at 134. L. SABATO, GOODBYE TO GOODTIME CHARLIE 66-69 (2d
ed. 1983).
42. L. SABATo, supra note 41, at 66-69.
43. Id.
44. Editorial, Chicago Tribune, supra note 38; Ciolli & Eisenberg, Patronage Jobs Illegal Polit-
ical Spoils System Declared Unconstitutional, Newsday, June 22, 1990, at 3.
45. Nowlan, supra note 37. For example, disgruntled contractors who do not contribute to the
political party in power might claim they have been penalized in violation of the first amendment.
Id. Denying a government contract because the contractor was not a political supporter arguably
would, under Rutan, penalize that contractor for his political beliefs, and thus violate the contrac-
tor's first amendment rights. Applicants or employees who are neither able nor willing to obtain
letters of recommendation from legislators, interest groups, or influential private citizens might also
have a claim under Rutan. Id. These persons could argue that they did not believe in the legislator
or interest group, or had no access to the influential person, and therefore were penalized for their
political beliefs and associations in violation of the first amendment. Without speculating on
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fails to delineate clearly which government positions are sufficiently po-
litically sensitive to be excluded from the Court's ban on patronage. Un-
doubtedly, the decision will create litigation that will test the parameters
of the exception.'
Finally, the Court's decision will have little effect on patronage.
Rutan prohibits only the most blatant forms of patronage, which voters
can address more effectively simply by voting the official out of office.47
Patronage still will occur in the government workplace; only the sources
and methods of disseminating information on applicants will change.4"
Phone calls and conversations in informal settings will replace standard-
ized forms. Party chairpersons no longer will keep long lists of approved
applicants; instead these lists will be held by others, such as interest
group leaders, individual campaign contributors, leaders in the business
community, and legislators who have political leverage with elected offi-
cials in control of hiring decisions.49
Governor Thompson's reaction to Rutan illustrates that future em-
whether these specific effects are "good" or "bad," the Rutan decision throws the "baby out with the
bathwater," protecting political freedom of association by sapping those associations of any conse-
quence. The New Republic, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 4. After Rutan, government officials will be
constantly involved in litigation, and in laying proper paper trails to justify their decisions.
46. The Rutan prohibition on patronage is limited to "employment positions for which party
affiliation is not an appropriate requirement." Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2734. After Rutan, former
Governor Thompson's legal counsel reportedly considered hiring outside consultants to help them
determine which positions Rutan embraces. Shomon, Governor's Office Issues Hiring Guidelines,
United Press International, July 19, 1990. Many predict that this will be a heavily litigated issue.
Id. Nowlan, supra note 37. Voters, however, have the ability to stop blatant patronage practices by
voting the elected official out of office.
47. Editorial, Chicago Tribune, supra note 38. Most state legislatures have implemented strict
civil service systems to abolish political patronage hiring. One report indicates that patronage hiring
accounts for only five percent of all state jobs in most states. T. BEYLE, supra note 1, at 135.
However, Beyle notes that the existence of patronage is difficult to measure because patronage is
difficult to define and recognize. Id. at 133-35. Another report indicates that in 1958, 49.3% of state
employees owed their jobs to patronage. In 1963, the figure had decreased to 46% and by 1980 the
figure further declined to 25%. L. SABATO, supra note 41, at 67.
48. Nowlan, supra note 37. Some have commented that most existing patronage systems will
be unaffected because they operate much more discreetly than did that of Illinois. Martin Ashare, an
attorney and chairman of the Republican Party in Suffolk County, New York, reportedly character-
ized the Illinois system as a smoking gun. "My sense is the government people here... may be far
more subtle and discreet about how they do this sort of thing." Newsday, supra note 44. In the
same article, Karen Burstein, formerly the head of New York's civil service system, called the deci-
sion "very easy to evade." Id.
49. When campaign contributions replace party support as the primary means of re-election,
government jobs and contracts are awarded to financial contributors rather than to party loyalists.
T, BEYLE, supra note 1, at 134.
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ployment decisions will not be made solely on the basis of performance.5"
One month after the decision, the Governor issued an order creating new
personnel guidelines tailored to meet the Rutan decision.51 Though the
guidelines prohibited basing employment decisions on party affiliation,
they stated that "[a]gencies may consider recommendations and referrals
from any source of any political party when making personnel
decisions."52
Although the advantages of a merit-based system may outweigh the
attributes of a patronage system, voters and state legislatures are capable
of making that determination without judicial interference, and without
the inevitable wave of litigation that the Rutan decision will create. 53
The end result of the Rutan decision will be little or no change in pa-
tronage politics. 54
S. Jay Dobbs
50. Rutan's protection applies to patronage based strictly on political affiliation. Without a
link to political affiliation, the first amendment claim vanishes. However, if one defines patronage to
include sponsorship rather than party affiliation, people like Cynthia Rutan will continue to be
passed over in favor of persons sponsored by political influences. See M. TOINET & J. GLENN,
CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION IN THE "OPEN" SOCIETY: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
203 (1982), reprinted in CLAPHAM, PRIVATE PATRONAGE AND PUBLIC POWER 193-210 (1982).
For example, Rutan does not protect an employee denied a promotion, not because of party affilia-
tion, but because the head of the administration received contributions from a business person who
recommended someone else for the job.
51. See Shoman, UPI Release, Governor's Office Issues Hiring Guidelines, July 18, 1990.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Many governors dismantled the patronage sys-
tems they inherited; other states dismantled patronage systems through legislation. L. SABATO,
supra note 41, at 69. Some governors feel that, on balance, using patronage as a means to secure
political support is not worth the animosity it creates. Id.
54. A recent study conducted by The Associated Press suggests that patronage hiring has con-
tinued after the Rutan decision. Conrad, Illinois Patronage Hiring Continues, Study Suggests, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, March 25, 1991, at 1. According to the study, almost 80% of those hired at a
new state prison and who declared a party preference were Republicans. The prison is located in a
county where Democrats outnumber Republicans by a 5-1 margin. Id. However, the number of
new hires who declared no party preference rose dramatically since the decision. 47% of employees
hired after Rutan declared no party preference, while only 14% of those hired before the Rutan
decision declared no party preference. Id. at 124. Governor Edgar's legal counsel reportedly stated
that the increase in employees showing no party preference indicates that the new administration has
effectively implemented Rutan. Id.
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